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This Note addresses two questions: how does the major questions doctrine 
affect the way agency lawyers advise policymaking clients, and how does that 
advice affect agency statutory interpretation and regulation? I first describe 
the doctrine and discuss normative theories for the role agency lawyers should 
play in statutory interpretation. Second, I consider the effects the doctrine had 
during the rulemaking, litigation, and rescission of the Clean Power Plan 
(CPP), the first ever federal regulation of power plants’ greenhouse-gas 
emissions. Finally, I identify four major concerns with the doctrine’s ex ante 
effects on agency statutory interpretation and regulatory processes. These 
critiques apply broadly, beyond the CPP. 
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Introduction  
“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an 
agency decisions of vast economic and political significance.”1 
 
On their own, those words—written by Justice Scalia for the Supreme 
Court majority in the 2014 case Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA 
(UARG)—seem like common sense. But rather than merely a call for clarity, 
those words have come to represent a controversial legal idea: the major 
questions doctrine. Though only debatably a formal legal doctrine given that 
the Supreme Court has never explicitly announced such a doctrine in a majority 
opinion,2 the theory can be stated as follows: while courts will generally defer 
to administrative agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes, where there is 
a question of “vast economic and political significance,”3 Congress needs to 
have spoken clearly in delegating such decisions to agencies. Where Congress 
has not spoken clearly on those issues, courts have the final say and often hold 
that agencies are acting beyond their statutory mandate.4 
Given the large number of agency regulatory decisions that could 
theoretically meet these criteria, the major questions doctrine might entirely 
remake the manner in which Congress delegates authority to agencies, agencies 
regulate, and courts review those regulations. The major questions doctrine’s 
impact on the third area—the way courts review regulations ex post—has 
begun to receive scholarly attention. But there has yet to be significant 
scholarly discussion of the second area—how the major questions doctrine 
impacts the way agencies regulate ex ante. Beginning to fill that void in the 
literature is the primary objective of this Note. In particular, this Note aims to 
describe the way agency lawyers, who play a prominent but undertheorized 
role in executive-branch statutory interpretation, understand the major 
questions doctrine and how they advise agency policymakers in light of it. 
In service of these aims, I consider as a case study one of the most 
significant environmental rulemakings since UARG—the Clean Power Plan 
 
1. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). 
2. See infra Section I.A. 
3. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324. 
4. See infra Section II.F. 
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(CPP).5 The CPP aimed to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from existing 
electric power plants for the first time in the country’s history, based on 
authority in the Clean Air Act (CAA). The CPP was proposed and finalized 
under President Obama in 2014 and 2015 respectively, litigated at the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2016, and rescinded under President 
Trump in 2017.6 I argue that the CPP rulemaking, litigation, and rescission 
raise at least four significant concerns about the major questions doctrine’s ex 
ante impact on agency lawyers, agency statutory interpretation, and regulation.7 
These concerns apply broadly when the major questions doctrine is invoked 
beyond the CPP context and build on ex post concerns that have been raised in 
the existing literature. Moreover, they should be of concern regardless of one’s 
prior views on the role of the administrative state and regardless of whether one 
is a textualist or a purposivist. 
First, rather than serving as an objective and nonideological tool of 
statutory interpretation, the major questions doctrine, as it has been applied, 
incentivizes agency lawyers to privilege deregulatory statutory interpretations 
over proregulatory ones. This privileging has occurred in rulemakings when 
agency lawyers limit the novelty of a regulation, even if that regulation, as 
proposed, is within the statute’s text and purpose. Privileging has also occurred 
in rescissions because, to date, agency lawyers have not relied on the major 
questions doctrine to check bold deregulatory executive action—even though 
an objective understanding of the doctrine suggests it could apply with equal 
force to proregulatory and deregulatory interpretations. The doctrine’s lack of 
objectivity should trouble committed textualists, as much as it does those in 
favor of purposive statutory interpretation. 
Second, the major questions doctrine takes interpretive authority away 
from agency lawyers because it forces them to spend more time determining 
what constitutes a major question under a vague standard than working to 
understand and identify Congress’s intended purpose, a role they are uniquely 
situated to play within the separation of powers scheme. Critically, this focus 
on litigation risk occurs even when the litigation risk bears no relation to the 
statute’s text or purpose, but instead to a highly subjective interpretive canon 
such as the major questions doctrine. 
 
5. By significant here, I refer both to the projected economic benefits and costs of the 
regulation, and to the public salience of the support and criticism the regulation received. 
6. As discussed in Part II, the EPA just recently finalized a replacement for the CPP, following 
both a proposed repeal and a proposed replacement. 
7. These ex ante concerns build on the  ex post concerns with the doctrine that Professor Lisa 
Heinzerling identified within Professor William Eskridge’s normative framework for evaluating the 
legitimacy of canons of statutory interpretation. See William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism and 
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 576-82 (2013) (evaluating canons of statutory 
interpretation based on their contribution to rule-of-law values, democratic values, and “unquestionably 
cherished” public values); Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1937 
(2017) (criticizing the major questions doctrine for, among other things, its lack of objectivity, 
predictability, and failure to promote democratic and public values). 
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Third, the doctrine has provided an easy tool for regulated-party 
commenters to exploit agency lawyers’ incentives and move regulations in a 
deregulatory direction by raising any colorable argument that a regulation is of 
economic or political significance. However, the doctrine has not provided 
such a tool to those other than regulated parties, including regulatory 
beneficiaries or those representing broad and diffuse interests. 
And fourth, the doctrine forces agency lawyers to guess whether judges 
will deem their action to implicate a major question. The Supreme Court has 
not clearly defined the term, and some judges use the major questions doctrine 
to express policy, rather than legal, preferences. This definitional ambiguity has 
an even more corrosive effect on agency deliberative processes and agency 
lawyers’ roles within the separation of powers scheme than a clearly defined 
major questions doctrine would. 
In this Note, I focus on these ex ante concerns with the major questions 
doctrine in the context of the CPP because that rule was a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking with a publicly available administrative record, agency legal 
memoranda, and partial litigation record. However, these concerns are by no 
means limited to this one rulemaking. In fact, since UARG, the district courts 
and courts of appeals have invoked the major questions doctrine in nine cases. 
These cases include some of the most high-profile administrative-law cases 
across policy areas, including cases like Texas v. United States,8 Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. U.S. Department of Labor,9 and Nevada v. 
U.S. Department of Labor.10 Moreover, all nine cases share common features 
and a common structure with the CPP rulemaking, such that the CPP can serve 
as a representative case study of major-questions-doctrine cases.11 In an era of 
political gridlock, presidential-driven regulatory policymaking is only likely to 
grow, including in areas outside of environmental policy. If the courts continue 
to rely on the major questions doctrine, the critical role agency lawyers play 
within these rulemaking processes will deteriorate further, leading to less 
deliberative processes and statutory interpretation that is less comprehensive—
rather than interpretation that properly relies on a range of tools, including text, 
purpose, textual canons, and substantive canons. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I sets the stage for this Note’s analysis 
of the ex ante effects of the major questions doctrine by first describing the 
 
8. 809 F.3d 134, 181 (5th Cir. 2015) (arguing that, if the Court had invoked Chevron analysis 
in evaluating President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA), it would have 
struck down the program under Chevron step 2 because DAPA “implicates ‘questions of deep economic 
and political significance’”). 
9. 885 F.3d 360, 380-81, 387 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that the Department of Labor’s fiduciary 
rule is unreasonable under Chevron step 2 because, among other reasons, “it took DOL forty years to 
‘discover’ its novel interpretation” and because “DOL has made no secret of its intent to transform the 
trillion-dollar market for IRA investments, annuities and insurance products ”). 
10. 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (arguing that the “great economic and 
political significance” of the Department of Labor’s overtime rule under President Obama further 
bolstered the argument that it should fail at Chevron step 1). 
11. See infra Section II.F. 
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doctrine. I then describe the institutional design of the executive branch and the 
role of executive branch lawyers within that structure in order to later assess 
the doctrine’s effect on agency lawyers, who represent a subset of executive 
branch lawyers. Although agency lawyers aim to minimize litigation risk, I 
explain how they are uniquely situated to serve as the executive branch’s 
purposive statutory interpreters—a role that even committed textualists may 
welcome them playing in limited circumstances and that the major questions 
doctrine significantly inhibits. 
Part II considers the effects of the major questions doctrine on the CPP 
rulemaking, litigation, and repeal. In particular, I discuss how the doctrine 
affected agency lawyers in two regards. First, the doctrine ultimately led 
agency lawyers to interpret the relevant statute in a manner that focused on a 
very narrow reading of the text, which could have resulted in more modest 
emissions reductions. Second, in doing so, the doctrine paradoxically led 
agency lawyers in the CPP context towards an outcome that limited the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ability to regulate in response to 
new environmental protection concerns—contrary to the CAA’s broadly 
acknowledged purpose. Critically, this restriction did not occur under a 
traditional understanding of textualism with objective interpretive canons. And 
it occurred even though agency lawyers’ initial textual, purposive, and 
proregulatory statutory interpretation was on strong footing under Chevron. I 
then contrast the care with which the major questions doctrine led agency 
lawyers to approach the CPP rulemaking with the lack of care agency lawyers 
believed was required of them during the CPP repeal and conclude that this 
kind of disparate treatment between proregulatory and deregulatory 
rulemakings is typical of the major questions doctrine’s effect on agency 
lawyers. And finally, I compare the CPP rulemaking with all of the recent 
circuit- and district-court cases that have cited the major questions doctrine. 
That comparison suggests that the CPP is largely representative of these recent 
cases, even if it is somewhat difficult to fully disentangle the effects of the 
major questions doctrine from broader litigation risks. 
In Part III, I detail the four significant ex ante concerns with the major 
questions doctrine discussed supra. 
In Part IV, I address counterarguments that both enthusiastic and reluctant 
proponents of the major questions doctrine raise, with a specific focus on how 
the CPP case study reveals serious flaws in these arguments. Based on this 
analysis and its application in the CPP context, I argue that the Court should 
abandon the doctrine in its current form, especially since it has not announced 
it in a clear or predictable way. Beyond simply abandoning the doctrine, I also 
recommend ways to cabin some of the most troubling ex ante impacts of the 
major questions doctrine, including ways the Court could better define what 
constitutes a major question. But assuming the Court continues to rely on the 
doctrine, I also discuss legislation that would allow the political branches to 
reclaim the interpretive authority that they are better equipped to hold. 
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I. The Major Questions Doctrine and the Role of Agency Lawyers 
This Part begins by discussing the Supreme Court’s development of the 
major questions doctrine in response to criticisms of Chevron, including the 
criticism that it violates the Marbury v. Madison principle that courts, rather 
than agencies, “say what the law is.”12 Before shifting to an analysis of the ex 
ante effects of the major questions doctrine on agency lawyers, I describe the 
institutional framework in which agency lawyers operate. I argue that, in 
response to presidential-driven regulatory policy, executive-branch lawyers are 
generally court-centered and aim to minimize litigation risk. In addition, I 
theorize that, due to their unique expertise, agency lawyers (a subset of 
executive-branch lawyers) should serve as the executive branch’s purposive 
statutory interpreters. I argue that even committed textualists may support this 
view in limited circumstances. This normative theory of agency lawyers sets 
the stage for my later discussion of the ex ante effect of the major questions 
doctrine on those lawyers. There, I argue that the doctrine compromises agency 
lawyers’ ability to play the constitutionally constructive role my institutional 
analysis suggests they should play. 
A. Development of the Major Questions Doctrine 
Chevron. v. NRDC13 has been the subject of extensive academic and 
judicial commentary, ranging from its novelty,14 to its efficiency and 
accountability advantages,15 to what some believe are grave separation of 
powers concerns.16 Against this backdrop, the major questions doctrine is 
typically viewed as one of several attempts to limit Chevron.17 
 
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
14. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006) (arguing 
that Chevron defied the Marbury v. Madison principle and declared that “in the face of ambiguity, it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the administrative department to say what the law is”). 
15. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 
676, 689-90 (2007) (painting Chevron deference as a largely efficiency-maximizing “voting rule”); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2229-30 (1997) 
(discussing the political accountability of agencies as agents of the President); Kenneth W. Starr, 
Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 309-10 (1986) (highlighting the 
practical benefits of Chevron related to agency expertise within the federal government); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2580 
(2006) (arguing that agencies are generally well positioned to interpret ambiguous statutes because of 
their “comparative expertise and accountability”). 
16. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(criticizing Chevron as inconsistent with separation of powers principles and Marbury v. Madison); 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing in 
an unusual opinion concurring with his own majority opinion that, without Chevron, courts would be 
able to “fulfill their duty to exercise their independent judgment about what the law is”); see also Pereira 
v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (referring to Chevron as a precedent that 
has become “increasingly maligned”). 
17. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 1937 (arguing that the major questions doctrine, in 
addition to requirements that the agency be an expert in the field and consider the costs of regulation, 
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Scholars have pointed to MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T18 in 
1994 as the Supreme Court’s first suggestion of the major questions doctrine.19 
There, the Court held that the Federal Communications Commission lacked 
authority to exempt certain carriers from regulation under its statutory authority 
to “modify” filing requirements for carriers because, according to the Court, it 
was “highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether 
an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency 
discretion.”20 In 2000, the Supreme Court more explicitly suggested a major 
questions doctrine—without making clear the centrality of that doctrine to its 
holding. The Court held that the Food and Drug Administration lacked the 
authority to regulate tobacco, notwithstanding its broad statutory authority to 
regulate “articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body.”21 According to the Court, it defied “common sense” that 
Congress would “delegate a policy decision of such economic and political 
magnitude to an administrative agency.”22 Finally, the major questions doctrine 
was more explicitly invoked in 2014, with Justice Scalia writing for the 
majority in UARG.23 There, the Court rejected, at Chevron step two, EPA’s 
argument that, because the agency had classified as a “single air pollutant” the 
“combined mix” of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change,24 it 
could require stationary-source greenhouse-gas emitters to obtain permits under 
the CAA as facilities that emit “any air pollutant.”25 
Describing the doctrine with more specificity is difficult because the 
Court has not set forth a coherent overarching definition and tends to not 
clearly announce to what extent a decision relies on the doctrine versus other 
traditional interpretive canons. For example, in a 2016 article, Professor Nathan 
Richardson attempted to analyze what constitutes a major question, in the 
Supreme Court’s view, settling on four major factors: a “major shift in 
 
constitute “power canons” of statutory interpretation that aim to take “interpretive power from an 
administrative agency.”). 
18. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). 
19. 512 U.S. 218 (1994); see Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: 
The Resurgent Major Questions Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 364 (2016) (beginning a discussion of 
the major questions doctrine with MCI). 
20. MCI Telecommunications, 512 U.S. at 231. 
21. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) (quoting 21 
U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2018)). 
22. Id. at 133. 
23. UARG, 573 U.S. at 322. 
24. Id. at 311 (citing Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 66516 (2009)). 
25. Id. at 316 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2018)). 
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regulatory scope,”26 “economic significance,”27 “political controversy,”28 and 
“thin statutory basis,”29 all of which are difficult to define precisely. 
B. Executive-Branch Institutional Design and the Role of Agency Lawyers 
Before analyzing the major questions doctrine’s ex ante effects on agency 
lawyers, it is necessary to understand the institutional design of the executive 
branch, the lawyers within it, and the role those lawyers should play in the 
constitutional separation of powers scheme. In subsequent Parts, I will argue 
that the major questions doctrine inhibits agency lawyers’ ability to play the 
constitutionally constructive role this Section theorizes they should play. 
Presidential-driven regulatory policymaking began under Presidents 
Reagan and Clinton30 and has only become more pronounced with political 
gridlock. Some scholars have raised separation of powers concerns regarding 
the enhanced role of the President in regulatory decision-making.31 Others have 
argued that lawyers within the executive branch serve as a necessary check on 
the abuse of presidential power.32 The lawyers who most frequently advise 
policymaker clients on statutory interpretation, judicial doctrines, and the 
legality of regulatory options are agency general counsels (GCs). Agency 
lawyers, who generally work in executive-branch agencies as part of agency 
GC offices, are undertheorized in the legal literature. But it is logical that they 
play such an important role in agency statutory interpretation and regulation. 
Unlike their agency policymaking colleagues, they are lawyers with presumed 
legal expertise. And unlike their Department of Justice (DOJ) colleagues in the 
Office of the Solicitor General (SG) or the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)—
whose incentives and behaviors are far more theorized in the legal literature—
agency lawyers are physically proximate to agency policy officials and have 
subject matter expertise that DOJ lawyers typically lack. Still, there are at least 
four reasons to believe that the literature on the SG’s office and OLC also 
 
26. Id. at 381. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 383. 
29. Id. at 384-85 (arguing that this factor is particularly unclear, referring not to ambiguity but 
rather a much less legally defensible idea, “the length of the relevant text,” and contending that “[i]f an 
agency asserts authority based on a single, short provision, the major questions . . . doctrine seems more 
likely to apply”). 
30. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2281-82 (2001) 
(arguing that building on President Reagan’s efforts, President Clinton “developed a set of practices that 
enhanced his ability to influence or even dictate the content of administrative initiatives”). 
31. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Lawmaking, 88 YALE 
L.J. 451, 451 (1979) (stating that the modern administrative state’s regulatory process has “challenged 
the effectiveness of the checks and balances designed by the Constitution”). 
32. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 515, 556 (2015) (arguing that administrative lawyers provide an effective counterweight to the 
President and political appointees, and that they are part of a system resembling the constitutional 
separation of powers system). 
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applies to agency GCs, while there is at least one reason to suspect agency GCs 
face somewhat different incentives than those lawyers. 
First, all three offices are within the executive branch, with the dual goal 
of representing executive-branch policymaker clients and broader rule of law 
interests. Like the SG, agency GCs are sometimes responsible for litigating 
agency interests and disputes ex post.33 Second, like OLC, agency GCs are 
responsible for advising executive-branch policymakers ex ante as they craft 
agency regulations. Third, agency GCs, like the SG and OLC, are highly 
incentivized to take a risk-averse approach to statutory interpretation. Then-
Professor Cornelia Pillard has suggested that the SG and OLC are motivated 
by, among other factors, “a court-centered view of constitutional law” in order 
to “reduce risks of damaging losses” in court.34 The same can likely be said of 
agency GCs, who share a similar incentive structure: courts decide whether 
agency actions are lawful, and agency lawyers want to reduce the risk that 
courts will hold agency actions unlawful. And fourth, as presumed experts on 
the law and the statutory interpretation, agency GCs likely hold implicit 
authority within their agencies similar to the authority that the SG’s office and 
OLC hold within the executive branch generally. As Pillard and others have 
noted, these lawyers “speak[] with a level of authority that [their] clients 
overwhelmingly respect.”35 
However, in contrast to SG and OLC lawyers, agency GCs are on the 
frontlines of interpreting statutes. As a result, they can and should become 
experts over time in their agency’s statutory mission, as determined by 
Congress.36 While OLC tends to get involved in highly contentious statutory-
interpretation issues and apply various trans-substantive canons of statutory 
interpretation, agency GCs are likely involved to some degree in every agency 
rulemaking and statutory-interpretation issue. For example, agency GCs may 
work to ensure multiple agency regulations fit together in a manner consistent 
with Congress’s broad statutory purpose, not just the text of a specific 
provision. Their sense of the cohesive regulatory structure is an institutional 
strength that not only courts but also OLC and other nonagency executive 
branch lawyers likely lack. As Professor Jerry Mashaw has written, unlike 
courts and other executive-branch lawyers, “agencies have a direct relationship 
with Congress that gives them insight into legislative purpose[] and meaning”; 
 
33. For example, once a regulation is promulgated and then challenged in court, an agency GC 
may assist the DOJ in defending the lawfulness of the regulation. Moreover, in certain cases, the agency 
GC may even serve as litigation co-counsel to DOJ. 
34. Cornelia T. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 676, 730 (2005); see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator 
Between Court and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 205 (“[T]he SG injects a legalistic, court-
centered perspective into agency decisionmaking, filtering agency arguments through a quasi-judicial 
screen so as to prepare them for presentation to the Court.”). 
35. Pillard, supra note 34, at 685; see also Lemos, supra note 34, at 204. 
36. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 
109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 877 (2015) (arguing that “regulatory statutes require agencies to engage in 
purposive interpretation and that agencies have relatively strong capacities to do so”). 
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for an agency to “ignore its institutional memory, would be to divest itself of 
critical resources in carrying out congressional design.”37 And as Professors 
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have written, “attention to institutional 
considerations can show why agencies might be given the authority to abandon 
textualism even if courts should be denied that authority.”38 Whereas OLC 
serves as a check on the agency in ensuring it does not exceed its specific 
statutory authority, agency GCs have the dual role of checking the agency and 
ensuring that statutory grants of authority are adaptable to new regulatory 
problems.39 And agency and OLC lawyers playing distinct roles that are 
consistent with their respective institutional strengths—with agency lawyers 
serving as purposive statutory interpreters and OLC as narrower interpreters—
should help agencies gain a more comprehensive understanding of statutory 
purpose and text on the most difficult statutory interpretation questions. 
Beyond the theoretical justifications for why agency GCs should play a 
purposive role in statutory interpretation, empirical analysis suggests that 
agency lawyers largely see their roles this way in practice. Professor 
Christopher Walker’s 2015 article based on survey results from “128 agency 
officials whose primary duties included statutory interpretation and 
rulemaking”40 reveals at least two widely held views of agency lawyers that 
broadly support this proposition. First, 76% of survey respondents reported that 
“in general, legislative history is a useful tool for interpreting statutes,”41 and 
93% perceived that the purpose of legislative history was to “explain the 
purpose of the statute.”42 Combined, those results indicate that agency lawyers 
interpreting statutes believe part of their job is understanding Congress’s 
purpose. Second, while only 56% of respondents reported a belief that 
ambiguities or gaps in a statute relating to “major policy questions” constitute 
an intentional delegation by Congress,43 75% “indicated that Congress intends 
for federal agencies to fill gaps or ambiguities relating to the agency’s own 
jurisdiction or regulatory authority.”44 And “jurisdictional questions” or 
ambiguity surrounding the agency’s jurisdiction are often the sources of a 
 
37. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry 
into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 511 (2005). 
38. Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
855, 928 (2003). 
39. While legal scholars have widely questioned OLC’s ability to provide the President and 
the executive branch neutral advice on national security policy, see, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, The Role 
of the OLC in Providing Legal Advice to the Commander-In-Chief After September 11th: The Choices 
Made by the Bush Administration Office of Legal Counsel, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY ISS. 
2 (2012), such criticism has not focused on climate policy specifically or domestic policy generally. 
40. Christopher Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1004 
(2015). 
41. Id. at 1038. 
42. Id. at 1041. 
43. Id. at 1055. 
44. Id. at 1058. 
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major policy question in the first place—though it was not in the CPP 
context.45 
Based on the theoretical justification for and the empirical analysis of 
agency lawyers as purposive statutory interpreters, for this Note, I adopt the 
framework of agency lawyers described supra: like other executive-branch 
lawyers, agency GCs rely primarily on judicial doctrines in order to minimize 
litigation risk, and they do so from a position of power and importance within 
their agencies and the executive branch. However, they play an important and 
distinct role in the separation of powers scheme when they employ a more 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 
While the remainder of this Note assumes that agency lawyers should be, 
and do in fact see themselves as, purposive statutory interpreters, one need not 
hold this view generally in order to conclude that the major questions doctrine 
has the negative ex ante effects on agency statutory interpretation and 
regulation that are discussed in this Note. For example, one might argue that 
certain statutes are specific enough in their delegation that they envision 
agency lawyers as strict textual interpreters. When, however, statutes delegate 
more open-ended authority to an agency, even those who do not accept the 
view that agency lawyers should be purposive statutory interpreters generally 
may be sympathetic to the idea that agency lawyers, more than other executive-
branch lawyers or courts, are well situated to consider statutory purpose in 
addition to other methods of statutory interpretation. 
The most committed and influential textualists acknowledge that there are 
certain statutes that are broad enough or ambiguous enough that some 
interpreter—whether an agency lawyer, other executive-branch lawyer, or a 
judge—will have no choice but to look beyond the text and the formalist, trans-
substantive canons of interpretation.46 In these cases, who is best positioned to 
do so and why? Justice Scalia himself cautioned against judges relying on 
substantive canons or what he called “presumptions and rules of construction 
that load the dice for or against a particular result.”47 Ironically, the major 
questions doctrine, developed in part by Justice Scalia, is just the kind of 
substantive or “dice-loading” canon he warned about.48 The doctrine forces 
 
45. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 
1005-06 (2013) (arguing that “[j]urisdictional questions often overlap with or are indistinguishable from 
‘major questions’”); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 126 (relying in part on 
the major questions doctrine to hold that “Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting 
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products”) (emphasis added). 
46. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 83 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 81, 83 (2017) (“I am skeptical of canons . . . . [E]very canon implicitly begins or ends with the 
statement ‘unless the context indicates otherwise,’ which potentially leaves so much room for maneuver 
that the canon isn’t doing much work.”). 
47. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 28 
(1997). 
48. Cf. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 
110 (2010) (“A court applying a canon to strain statutory text uses something other than the legislative 
will as its interpretive lodestar, and in so doing, it acts as something other than a faithful agent. The 
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judges to presume that Congress could not have intended an agency to take a 
certain regulatory path. Though it is impossible to know based on what the 
Court has announced to date, this presumption could apply no matter how 
broad the text of a delegation and notwithstanding any legislative context or 
evidence that Congress intended to give an agency broad regulatory authority. 
Even a textualist might acknowledge that, where textualism alone cannot 
answer a given interpretive question, an agency lawyer who is expert in the 
underlying authorizing statute is more likely to possess the necessary tools for 
comprehensive statutory interpretation than is a generalist judge wielding a 
“dice-loading” canon that deems agency interpretations of major questions 
presumptively invalid without relying on more comprehensive tools of 
statutory interpretation.49 Rather than a “dice-loading” canon, Chevron is better 
understood as a deference doctrine that allows agencies and courts to rely on a 
multitude of interpretive tools—text, purpose, textual canons, and substantive 
canons. As Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, put it, under Chevron, a 
Court must still “employ[] traditional tools of statutory construction” in order 
to “ascertain[]” whether “Congress had an intention on the precise question at 
issue.”50 The major questions doctrine is different. Under it, when courts 
determine that the agency is answering a major question without an explicit 
delegation, the agency interpretation is presumptively invalid and other 
interpretive tools are ignored. When judges choose this latter path and ignore 
more comprehensive and deliberative statutory interpretation, the major 
questions doctrine has both negative ex post and ex ante effects. While 
undertheorized in the existing literature, the negative ex ante effects raise 
troubling separation of powers concerns and will be the focus of Parts II and 
III. 
II. Clean Power Plan 
This Part outlines the process for the CPP rulemaking and the rescission 
and describes the interaction between the White House, EPA policymakers, and 
lawyers in the development of the CPP. In particular, I explain how regulated 
parties effectively utilized the major questions doctrine to move EPA lawyers 
away from their proregulatory statutory interpretation, even though it was 
based on strong textual and purposive arguments. Instead, relying on the major 
questions doctrine, regulated parties pushed EPA lawyers toward a narrower 
statutory interpretation and a less progressive regulation as a way to limit 
litigation risk, even if the textual justifications for the latter approach were thin 
at best. In doing so, perhaps against their wishes but at the urging of regulated 
parties, EPA GC paradoxically employed a statutory interpretation that was 
 
application of substantive canons, therefore, is at apparent odds with the central premise from which 
textualism proceeds.”). 
49. See infra Section II.F. 
50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 866 n.9. 
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contrary to the CAA’s broadly acknowledged purpose and no more consistent 
with its text than those lawyers’ previous interpretation. This shift is in contrast 
to a vision of agency lawyers as purposive statutory interpreters—a shift that 
may even trouble committed textualists in limited circumstances like the one 
described in this case study. 
This Part proceeds as follows: first, I describe President Obama’s 
direction to the EPA to regulate emissions from new and existing power plants. 
Second, I discuss the agency’s proposed rule and conclude that the EPA GC’s 
textual and purposive justifications under Chevron were well-founded. Third, I 
document how regulated parties’ comments that raised major-questions-
doctrine concerns resulted in a narrower statutory interpretation that was not a 
better reading of the statute’s text or purpose, but that ultimately led to less 
regulatory ambition. Fourth, I discuss the focus on the major questions doctrine 
in the litigation that followed the rulemaking and the lack of uniformity in the 
manner in which the judges approached the supposedly objective question of 
whether the rule was of economic or political significance. Fifth, I show that, 
unlike during the rulemaking, agency lawyers did not rely on the major 
questions doctrine to moderate the scope of the rescission, which illustrates 
objectivity and neutrality concerns with the doctrine. And finally, I examine all 
of the recent major-questions-doctrine cases before district and circuit courts to 
explain how the CPP rulemaking is largely representative of those cases, even 
if it is difficult to fully disentangle the effects of the major questions doctrine 
from the effects of broader litigation risks. 
A. Direction to EPA and Statutory Background 
On June 25, 2013, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum 
directing the EPA to issue carbon dioxide regulations for existing-source power 
plants under the CAA.51 The section of the CAA (section 111(d)) under which 
President Obama directed EPA to regulate provides that the Administrator shall 
“prescribe regulations which shall establish a procedure . . . under which each 
State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which . . . establishes standards 
of performance.”52 The term “standard of performance,” which subsequently 
became the subject of a critical statutory interpretation question, is defined as: 
 
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission 
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and 
 
51. Presidential Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. (June 25, 2013), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201300457/pdf/DCPD-
201300457.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G6J-UBEY] (directing EPA to regulate under sections 111(b) and 
111(d) of the CAA). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2018). 
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any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) 
the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.53 
 
After issuing “emission guidelines” to identify the “best system of emissions 
reduction” (BSER),54 EPA calculates the emission limitation achievable using 
the BSER. States are permitted to either apply standards of performance to 
their regulated sources that achieve an equivalent or better emission limitation 
or EPA will apply a federal plan to that state.55 As a result, states need not 
adopt specific emission-reduction techniques in the BSER, but they typically 
must achieve emissions reductions in line with the BSER unless a specific 
source qualifies for an adjusted regulatory treatment based on its remaining 
useful life or other factors. 
B. Agency Proposed Rule and the EPA GC’s Legal Analysis 
While there were several legal issues at stake surrounding the CPP, the 
most notable relates to how EPA defined the BSER. Based in part on broad 
interpretations of the BSER in case law,56 EPA released a proposed rule that 
calculated the BSER based on four “building blocks”: 
 
1. Relying on heat rate improvements at coal-fired electric generating units 
(EGUs). 
2. Shifting generation at coal-fired EGUs to underutilized (lower emitting) gas-
fired power plants. 
3. Shifting generation from fossil fuel fired power plants to zero-emitting 
generation sources. 
4. Using demand-side energy efficiency that reduces the amount of generation 
required.57 
 
As noted, the BSER and the associated building blocks did not direct 
states or power companies to take any specific actions, and no state would be 
required to adopt one of the building blocks. Rather, the building blocks were 
the tools EPA planned to use to calculate by how much emissions could be 
reduced from each regulated source. That said, the measures that constituted 
 
53. Id. § 7411(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
54. 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(b)(5) (2019) (providing that guidelines will “reflect[] the application of 
the best system of emission reduction (considering the cost of such reduction) that has been adequately 
demonstrated for designated facilities, and the time within which compliance with emission standards of 
equivalent stringency can be achieved”). 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a), (c); 40 C.F.R. § 60.24 (2019). 
56. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (providing that, in 
setting the BSER, EPA may consider “cost, energy, and environmental impacts in the broadest sense at 
the national and regional levels and over time as opposed to simply at the plant level in the immediate 
present”). 
57. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830, 34836 (proposed June 18, 2014). 
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the BSER would still have had a significant effect on the environmental and 
economic impacts of the rule. All else equal, if more measures were included in 
the BSER, states would have had to reduce their emissions by a greater 
amount. 
Along with the proposed rule, EPA GC released a memo providing a legal 
justification for key components of the rule, including a Chevron analysis of 
the BSER and the four building blocks. Much of the BSER argument focused 
on the legality of building blocks 2, 3, and 4, which dealt with measures that 
took into consideration aspects of the electricity grid that were “beyond the 
fenceline” of the source. Specifically, the statutory-interpretation question was 
whether these so-called “beyond the fenceline” measures could be considered 
part of a “system of emission reduction.” Only building block 1 focused on 
reducing pollution solely through physical equipment at the source. Building 
blocks 2 and 3 focused on emission reductions that power plants could achieve 
by replacing their generation with cleaner and lower-emitting generation. For 
example, a power plant reducing emissions under building block 2 or 3 could 
do so respectively by reducing its generation, or, in a state that choose an 
emission-rate-based compliance framework, by buying credits that represented 
increased generation by lower-emitting sources. And a power plant reducing 
emissions under building block 4 would provide incentives for customers to 
use less energy, likely through support for energy-efficiency measures, which 
would similarly allow it to reduce its generation and therefore its emissions. 
Using a Chevron two-step analysis, and without considering the economic 
or political significance of the agency’s interpretation, the GC memo argued 
that building blocks 2, 3, and 4 were lawful interpretations of the term “system 
of emission reduction”: 
 
because that phrase, in the context in which it is used in section 111 and by its 
terms, is broad enough to apply to the measures in the building blocks, in light 
of the integrated nature of the electricity grid. Through the integrated grid, the 
measures reduce overall demand for, and therefore utilization of, higher 
emitting, fossil fuel-fired EGUs, which, in turn, reduces CO2 emissions from 
those EGUs.58 
 
Chevron step 1 asks whether Congress has directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, and the GC memo argued that Congress did so, in favor of 
the agency’s interpretation. The CAA does not explicitly define the word 
“system,” so the GC memo relied on the dictionary definition of the word: “a 
set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or interconnecting 
 
58. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LEGAL MEMORANDUM FOR 
PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING 
UNITS 49-50 (Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter CPP PROPOSED RULE LEGAL MEMORANDUM], 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602-legal-memorandum.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AZ5F-DN65]. 
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network; a complex whole.”59 The memo focused on the idea of the 
interconnectedness and complexity of the electric grid: the exact type of 
“interconnecting network” to which the dictionary definition referred.60 The 
memo next argued that Congress intended a broad definition of the word 
“system” because “no other provisions in the definition of ‘standard of 
performance’ include any other constraints on the type of ‘things’ that may 
serve as the basis for the standard for emissions.”61 
The memo next proceeded to Chevron step 2, which asks whether the 
agency’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute. And the GC 
memo argued that if the terms of the statute were ambiguous (which the agency 
argued was not the case), the agency’s interpretation of the term “system” 
would still be reasonable. In this step, the GC memo considered both the 
statutory changes and legislative history of the CAA, in addition to its broad 
statutory purpose. First, the GC memo pointed out that, between 1977 and 
1990, Congress differentiated the statutory text for new sources and existing 
sources (the latter of which is the subject of the CPP): “best technological 
system of continuous emission reduction”62 and “best system of continuous 
emission reduction”63 respectively. This differentiation could suggest that 
Congress intended for the agency to calculate a BSER for existing, as opposed 
to new, sources using factors that went beyond a specific source’s technology. 
These permissible factors might then include replacement of existing 
generation with cleaner and lower emitting generation or reduction in the 
overall use of energy, as was the case in the proposed rule’s buildings blocks 2, 
3, and 4.  Moreover, the 1977 House-Senate Conference Committee report 
stated that for existing sources, the standards of performance were to be based 
on the best “available means of emission control (not necessarily 
technological),” implying that considerations outside of technological 
improvements to the individual sources could be a factor in identifying the 
BSER.64 The GC memo also relied on another section of the CAA, which 
refers to “the retrofit application of the best system of continuous emission 
reduction,”65 a more limited application of BSER than section 111(d)’s. 
Together, these factors supported the view that EPA’s CPP interpretation was 
reasonable because “[w]here Congress uses certain language in one part of a 
 
59. Id. at 36 (quoting System, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2010)). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 51-52.  
62. Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
63. Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
64. H.R. REP. NO. 95-564, at 129 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 3 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 502, 509 (1978). The 
House Committee Report included the same statement. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 195 (1977), reprinted 
in 4 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 2465, 2662. 
65. CPP PROPOSED RULE LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 58, at 59 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
7651f(b)(2) (2018)) (emphasis added). 
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statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress 
acts intentionally.”66 
Second, the GC memo argued that interpreting the BSER “broadly to 
include the building blocks is consistent with a primary purpose of the CAA, 
which is encouraging pollution prevention, including assuring that states fulfill 
their role in developing pollution prevention measures.”67 Further, the GC 
memo argued that EPA had previously regulated with this broad purpose in 
mind under section 111(d) when it authorized “states to allow large municipal 
waste combustors to average their emission rates and trade NOx emission 
credits.”68 The methodology of permitting averaging and trading meant that 
waste combustors could achieve emissions reductions in more ways that merely 
making technological changes to the sources of emissions themselves. 
There was only limited scholarly analysis of the GC’s Chevron arguments 
for the proposed rule, but that limited analysis supported the GC’s arguments. 
Professor Jody Freeman, for example, expressed modest confidence in the 
agency’s Chevron-step-1 analysis.69 Moreover, she argued that the agency’s 
Chevron-step-2 analysis was even stronger.70 Despite Freeman and the GC’s 
argument, I believe it is unlikely that a reviewing court, particularly the 
Supreme Court, would have held that Congress spoke precisely on the meaning 
of the word “system” because Congress did not define the word in the statute or 
the legislative history. However, I believe that the GC’s argument, and 
Freeman’s analysis of it, at Chevron step 2 is correct. Agency interpretations 
are afforded broad interpretive deference at Chevron step 2,71 and the agency’s 
interpretation was reasonable based on the statutory text, legislative history, 
and the broadly acknowledged purpose of the CAA as legislation passed to 
delegate broad authority to the EPA to deal with future environmental 
problems.72 Even a committed textualist faithfully following the Chevron 
framework could find reason to support the reasonableness of the agency’s 
initial interpretation. And, as I discuss in the next section, later criticism of the 
interpretation focused largely on the major questions doctrine, instead of on 
statutory text or the traditional canons of interpretation. 
 
66. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012). 
67. CPP PROPOSED RULE LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 58, at 56-57. 
68. Id. at 69 (internal citations omitted). 
69. Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 13 (2015) 
(arguing that the plain meaning of the statute and legislative history supported the agency’s 
interpretation at step 1). 
70. Id. (arguing that the “integrated nature of the electricity system” makes the agency’s 
argument eminently reasonable under step 2). 
71. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 100 (“At step two, courts almost 
never overturn agency interpretations as unreasonable.”). 
72. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (stating that, in drafting the CAA, 
Congress understood that, “without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific 
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete”). 
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B. Major Questions Doctrine in Comments, the Final Rule, and the EPA GC’s 
Legal Analysis 
Despite Freeman’s belief that the agency’s interpretation would survive 
under a Chevron analysis, she expressed concern that, in the wake of UARG 
(which was announced five days after EPA issued its CPP proposed rule), the 
Supreme Court would invoke the major questions doctrine to evaluate the 
agency’s interpretation.73 While we will never know how courts would have 
ruled on this interpretation, Freeman accurately predicted industry’s response 
to the interpretation. The GC memo did not invoke the major questions 
doctrine. But after the notice-and-comment period, particularly after receiving 
comments from regulated parties, the major questions doctrine had a major 
impact on the EPA GC, and it was ultimately among the central issues litigated. 
The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG), an ad hoc, unincorporated 
association of electric generating companies that is now defunct, submitted a 
comment to EPA on December 1, 2014.74 That comment—and its arguments, 
which were cited in subsequent comments—would significantly impact the 
GC’s response in the final rule and the litigation that followed. Notably, rather 
than lead with textual arguments, UARG’s comment focused on its own view 
of the purpose of the CAA and its predicted effects of the regulation. The 
comment’s introduction concluded: “EPA has chosen an obscure and little used 
provision of the CAA as the basis for an unprecedented regulatory program that 
will undeniably alter the nation’s economy.”75 Commenting in particular on 
building blocks 2, 3, and 4, UARG argued that: 
 
This “beyond-the-source” approach would allow EPA to restructure every 
aspect of the states’ electric power markets and regulate any electricity user—
effectively, to administer the entire national economy—for the purposes of 
reducing demand for and generation by sources in the listed source category 
(i.e., existing fossil fuel-fired EGUs).76 
 
After invoking the major questions doctrine, UARG argued that the EPA 
should withdraw building blocks 2, 3, and 4, and did not proceed to a Chevron 
analysis. Instead, UARG spent the bulk of its comment arguing that the major 
questions doctrine should preclude any kind of deference. 
 
73. Freeman, supra note 69, at 16-17 (citing the facts that section 111(d) is “little-used,” both 
costs and benefits are high, and Congress failed to enact cap and trade legislation as reasons the Court 
might consider the CPP to trigger the major questions doctrine). 
74. UARG was also the named petitioner in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG), 
573 U.S. 302 (2014), the case discussed above and cited throughout this Note. 
75. Utility Air Regulatory Group, Comments on Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-22768&
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/B6CE-SN4K]. 
76. Id. at 31. 
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After regulated parties voiced these concerns, the agency made significant 
changes to the rule, and the GC made significant changes to the legal analysis. 
Here, I focus on two that are most related to the major questions doctrine: the 
elimination of building block 4 (demand-side consumer energy efficiency) 
from the BSER and a set of arguments addressing why the major questions 
doctrine should not preclude Chevron analysis for building blocks 2 and 3 
(shifting generation to lower-emitting fossil fuels and to renewable energy, 
respectively). 
In eliminating building block 4 from the BSER, the agency determined 
that, “because the affected EGUs must be able to achieve their emission 
performance rates through the application of the BSER, the BSER must be 
controls or measures that the EGUs themselves can implement.”77 In other 
words, they must be measures that “owners or operators” of sources can 
implement themselves.78 This new interpretation directly contrasted with 
EPA’s broader interpretation in the proposed rule that the BSER could reflect 
measures throughout the entire electric grid even if those measures entailed 
reduced overall production.79 Moreover, the agency did not attempt to argue 
that its new interpretation aligned more with the statute’s purpose or text. 
Instead, the analysis focused on past practice: 
 
[O]ur traditional interpretation and implementation of CAA section 111 has 
allowed regulated entities to produce as much of a particular good as they desire 
provided that they do so through an appropriately clean (or low-emitting) 
process. While building blocks 1, 2, and 3 fall squarely within this paradigm, the 
proposed building block 4 does not.80 
 
This argument is a major reversal from the proposed rule and the GC’s 
view that building block 4 was a reasonable interpretation of the statute. As 
discussed above, there, the agency argued that building block 4 should survive 
judicial review under either Chevron step 1 or Chevron step 2. Yet, after 
regulated parties attacked the lawfulness of building blocks 2, 3, and 4 under 
the major questions doctrine, EPA reversed its position and removed building 
block 4—without stating conclusively whether it determined that building 
block 4 was an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. 
Moreover, the agency publicly acknowledged that this step was taken to 
reduce litigation risk. Specifically, the agency acknowledged that it did not 
accept as true the argument that building block 4 would fundamentally 
transform the economy. Rather, the change had “the benefit of allaying legal 
and other concerns raised by commenters [UARG], including concerns that 
 
77. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64776 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
78. Id. at 64720. 
79. CPP PROPOSED RULE LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 58, at 36. 
80. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64738. 
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individuals could be ‘swept into’ the regulatory process by imposing 
requirements on ‘every household in the land.’”81 And despite the reversal, 
states were still permitted to use demand-side energy efficiency to meet their 
targets.82 Basing an interpretive change not on statutory text, or even purpose, 
but instead entirely on litigation risk related to a highly subjective interpretive 
canon that is disconnected from the statute’s text and purpose should be of 
concern to purposivists and textualists alike. 
In addition to the reversal on building block 4, the final rule GC memo 
vigorously defended building blocks 2 and 3 against parallels to UARG and 
Brown & Williamson for two main reasons. First, “in both cases, the agencies’ 
interpretation of one part of the relevant statute created a direct conflict with 
another part of the statute.”83 However, here, “the agency’s interpretation does 
not create conflicts with other provisions of the Clean Air Act that would 
render the statute internally inconsistent or ‘unrecognizable to the Congress 
that enacted it.’”84 Second, “the BSER, as well as the scope of available 
compliance options the agency is recognizing in the final rule, is fully 
consistent with current trends in the industry.”85 As a result, building blocks 2 
and 3 would not have had the significant and transformative effect on the 
economy or the electricity sector that industry argued, according to the EPA 
GC. Paradoxically, EPA GC did not clarify why both of these arguments did 
not apply to building block 4. 
C. Discussion of the Major Questions Doctrine at Oral Argument 
Shortly after the final rule was published in the Federal Register, a 
coalition of regulated parties and states filed suit against the agency.86 The 
petitioners alleged that building blocks 2 and 3 were an impermissible 
interpretation of the statute87 and that Chevron deference did not apply “once 
the UARG clear statement rule is triggered.”88 The government (the 
Department of Justice’s Environmental Defense Section with the EPA GC as of 
counsel) countered with the argument that the GC put forward in the proposed 
 
81. Id. at 64779 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. at 310 (2014)). 
82. Id. at 64674. 
83. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LEGAL MEMORANDUM FOR 
FINAL CARBON POLLUTION EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING 
UNITS 133 (OCT. 23, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/cpp-legal-
memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BA2-56TM]. 
84. Id. at 134. 
85. Id. at 135. 
86. A D.C. Circuit panel consisting of Judges Henderson, Rogers, and Srinivasan denied the 
States’ motion for a stay. Order, West Virginia v. EPA (In re Murray Energy Corp.), 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 21, 2016). But Justice Roberts writing for the Supreme Court, with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor dissenting, stayed the rule pending review on the merits by the D.C. Circuit. 
Grant of Application for Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
87. Motion for Stay at 17, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
88. Motion in Opposition to Stay at 3, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
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rule legal memo: that EPA had the correct interpretation of the statute under 
Chevron step 1 and that, even if it did not, the interpretation should be upheld 
as reasonable under Chevron step 2.89 The government argued that the Chevron 
standard was “clearly applicable to the Agency’s interpretations of the Act, and 
EPA is well-qualified to fill the gap left open by any ambiguity in the CAA.”90 
And the government also relied on its decision to withdraw building block 4 
from the BSER as further evidence of the reasonableness of its interpretation.91 
Once the case proceeded to oral argument before the en banc D.C. Circuit, 
much of the questioning focused on whether the rule triggered the major 
questions doctrine. In an exchange with Judge Tatel, Elbert Lin, Solicitor 
General of West Virginia, conceded that the States’ main argument was that the 
case should not proceed to a traditional Chevron analysis.92 It is impossible to 
know whether the States employed a major questions doctrine analysis because 
they believed they had an untenable case under a purposive or textual approach 
to Chevron, but that is at least one possibility. 
In oral argument, the judges appeared divided on whether the CPP 
triggered the major questions doctrine. Judge Griffith’s exchange with Solicitor 
General Lin is just one example: 
 
JUDGE GRIFFITH: [T]his doesn’t sound like UARG . . . . It doesn’t sound like 
Brown & Williamson . . . . [I]n UARG you had millions of new sources that were 
to be regulated, Brown & Williamson you had a whole new industry, and now 
you’re talking about a marginal difference, some experts say a five percent 
difference, your experts say 10 percent difference, by 2030, that doesn’t seem to 
me to be transformative.93 
 
Judge Tatel suggested that Chevron was the proper framework because the 
CPP would not have been “unrecognizable” to the Congress that passed the 
CAA,94 another key characteristic identified by the Supreme Court in triggering 
the major questions doctrine.95 
On the other hand, then-Judge Kavanaugh expressed the importance of the 
major questions doctrine to the separation of powers,96 and his view that the 
 
89. Id. at 26. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 24 (arguing that one cabining force on the statute is a prohibition against 
“considering only those systems that do not require any reduction in aggregate production levels within 
an industry, which precludes consideration of, e.g., demand-side efficiency measures.”). 
92. Oral Argument at 9-10, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 
2016). 
93. Id. at 5-6. 
94. Id. at 6-7. 
95. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (observing that the Court was “confront[ing] a singular 
situation: an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy while at the 
same time strenuously asserting that the authority claimed would render the statute unrecognizable to 
the Congress that designed it.”) (emphasis added)). 
96. Oral Argument at 42, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330. 
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CPP triggered the doctrine and was therefore not entitled to Chevron. He called 
the CPP a “huge case . . . it’s got huge . . . economic and political significance, 
Congress is focused on it, the President announces it in the East Room, it has 
huge international repercussions.”97 He continued: 
 
JUDGE KAVANAUGH: EPA when it has to single-mindedly focus on the 
emissions reductions, but there are people, lots of people, you know, lose their 
jobs, lose their livelihoods, whole communities are going to be left behind, parts 
of whole states are going to be left behind, and that’s why for a big question like 
this Congress can do things like job training programs . . . [T]hat’s why the 
separation of powers principle matters, because Congress can look at something 
like this in a well-rounded approach.98 
 
The focus on the major questions doctrine in oral argument and the varying 
manners in which the judges approached the issue likely justified the anxiety 
that EPA lawyers felt in narrowing the scope of the final rule compared to the 
proposed rule, even if doing so had little textual or purposive basis. Judges 
were divided on what constituted a major question, and some of the judges’ 
arguments combined anti-regulatory policy arguments against the CPP with the 
major questions doctrine. For example, one could argue that, even in the 
context of the separation of powers comment that then-Judge Kavanaugh made, 
questions related to predicted job loss and decreased community livelihood are 
closer to the policy questions that actors within the political branches ought to 
ask than they are to the legal questions that judges ought to ask. Against this 
backdrop, and regardless of the substantive policy area at issue, it is likely quite 
difficult for risk-averse and court-centered agency lawyers to take any path 
other than encouraging their policymaking clients to be as modest in regulatory 
scope as possible—even if that kind of advice is contrary to statutory text, 
Congress’s likely purpose, and a vision of agency lawyers as having unique 
institutional strengths as purposive statutory interpreters. 
D. CPP Repeal 
After President Trump’s election, the D.C. Circuit held the CPP litigation 
in abeyance (it had not yet issued an opinion following oral argument), and on 
March 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing the EPA 
to “take all steps necessary to review the final rules” of the CPP and “suspend, 
revise, or rescind the guidance.”99 On October 16, 2017, EPA published in the 
Federal Registrar a proposal to repeal the CPP and seek comment and potential 
replacements for it.100 While the CPP proposed rule and proposed rule legal 
 
97. Id. at 44-45. 
98. Id. at 63. 
99. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
100. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017). 
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memorandum were a combined 235 pages (130 and 105 respectively), the 
proposed repeal was 15 pages without an accompanying legal memorandum. 
Critically, the agency changed its interpretation of the BSER, stating that it 
was: 
 
limited to emission reduction measures that can be applied to or at an individual 
stationary source. That is, such measures must be based on a physical or 
operational change to a building, structure, facility, or installation at that source, 
rather than measures that the source’s owner or operator can implement on 
behalf of the source at another location.101 
 
This interpretation was far narrower than the proposed rule’s definition (“a set 
of things working together as parts of a mechanism or interconnecting 
network”102) and the final rule’s definition (measures that “owners or 
operators” of sources can implement themselves).103 Under the new proposed 
definition, the Trump EPA position was that only building block 1 would have 
been legally permissible because any change other than a “physical or 
operational change to a building, structure, facility, or installation at that 
source” was not a proper interpretation of the word “system” and therefore 
could not be included in the BSER calculation. 
As with the change between the Obama proposed and final rules, it is 
difficult to see this recent shift as justified on either textual or purposive terms. 
Though the agency did of course discuss the relevant statutory provision104 and 
nearby provisions under a whole-act rule-type analysis,105 it is difficult to read 
that section of the proposed rule as dispositive, given the text’s ambiguity. 
However, the agency’s later discussion of the major questions doctrine and its 
view that the new interpretation “is more consistent with certain broader policy 
concerns of the Agency and stakeholders”106 may have carried more 
interpretive weight. Moreover, EPA argued that this proposed interpretation 
was subject to Chevron deference rather than the major questions doctrine it 
now argued applied to the original rulemaking. EPA attempted to justify these 
differing levels of review by arguing that agencies have broad authority to 
revisit prior statutory interpretations.107 EPA also based this argument on the 
fact that the repeal, unlike the original rulemaking, would not have “serious 
 
101. Id. at 48039. 
102. CPP PROPOSED RULE LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 58, at 36. 
103. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64720 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
104. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48039 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 48042. 
107. Id. at 48039 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 981 (2005)). 
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economic and political consequences.”108 This argument seems to evaluate 
whether a deregulatory action would have “serious economic and political 
consequences” by comparing the action to the world before the original 
regulatory action took place—that is, deregulating has no significant economic 
and political consequences compared to a world without the regulation in the 
first place. But the EPA rarely, if ever, deregulates in this kind of regulation-
free world. Rather, EPA deregulates in a status quo with significant regulations 
already in place. Eliminating the CPP compared to a status quo with the CPP 
would have “serious economic and political consequences” by practically any 
measure. A more objective major questions doctrine—one that scrutinizes an 
agencies’ deregulatory interpretations as closely as their proregulatory ones—
would take account of this reality, while the current doctrine does not. But 
given the landscape of recent major questions doctrine cases before the district 
and circuit courts,109 EPA lawyers likely concluded that this kind of judicial 
review was extremely unlikely. 
EPA proposed a replacement, known as the Affordable Clean Energy 
(ACE) rule, on August 31, 2018.110 The associated final rule was published in 
the Federal Register on July 8, 2019.111 That rule relies on the proposed 
repeal’s interpretation of the BSER and is therefore focused only on “[heat 
reduction improvement] measures that can be applied at an affected 
source”112—the functional equivalent of building block 1 only. In addition, 
environmental advocates have widely criticized the proposal because it gives 
states wide latitude not just in how they meet their targets (as was the case in 
the CPP) but also in whether they choose to meet their targets at all.113 
E. Representativeness of the CPP Rulemaking 
Before turning to the broader implications of the invocation of the major 
questions doctrine in the CPP rulemaking, it is necessary to understand how 
representative the CPP is of other rulemakings and litigation involving the 
major questions doctrine. In particular, one might argue that the CPP is 
unrepresentative for two reasons that I address here: first, because the major 
 
108. Id. at 48042 (seeking comment on whether the agency, by “substantially diminishing the 
potential economic and political consequences of any future regulation” no longer implicates the major 
questions doctrine). 
109. See infra Section II.F. 
110. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New 
Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31, 2018). 
111. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing 
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (Jul. 8, 2019). 
112. 83 Fed. Reg. at 44748. 
113. See, e.g., Julie McNamara, Trump Administration’s “Affordable Clean Energy” Rule Is 
Anything But, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS BLOG (Aug. 31, 2018, 10:34 AM), 
https://blog.ucsusa.org/julie-mcnamara/ace-dangerous-clean-power-plan-replacement 
[https://perma.cc/HR9D-RN6A]. 
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questions doctrine may apply with equal force to cases when an agency is 
interpreting a statute more broadly or more narrowly than a previous 
interpretation; and second, because it is difficult to disaggregate the role of the 
major questions doctrine from other legal concerns that are raised in a 
particular rulemaking. 
First, a review of circuit and district court cases since UARG that cited the 
major questions doctrine, as stated in UARG, suggests that the courts of appeals 
and district courts rely on the major questions doctrine as a tool to check broad 
statutory interpretations or relative expansions of agency authority, as agency 
lawyers suspected they would in the CPP rulemaking. However, these courts 
do not appear to be invoking the doctrine in cases where an agency narrows its 
interpretation or attempts to contract its authority, even though agencies have 
done so frequently in the first years of the Trump Administration.114 In 
particular, the UARG language has been cited in nine separate circuit and 
district court cases since 2014: once by the Fourth Circuit,115 three times by the 
Fifth Circuit,116 once by the Seventh Circuit,117 twice by the D.C. Circuit,118 
and once respectively by district courts in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits.119 
Of those nine cases, none involved a challenge to a statutory interpretation 
for being too narrow; all involved a challenge to a statutory interpretation that 
was allegedly overbroad. Courts struck down statutory interpretations made 
during the Obama Administration in part on major questions doctrine grounds 
four times: the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule in Chamber of Commerce 
v. United States, the Department of Homeland Security’s Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans (DAPA) program in Texas v. United States, the Bureau 
of Land Management’s hydraulic fracturing rule in Wyoming v. DOI, and the 
Department of Labor’s overtime rule in Nevada v. United States. Moreover, of 
the four times that courts have cited the doctrine in cases dealing with statutory 
interpretations during the Trump Administration, two cases similarly involved 
a court determining that an agency had exceeded its statutory authority with its 
new interpretation. In City of Chicago v. Sessions, the Seventh Circuit cited 
UARG in holding that the Attorney General’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute as providing him with the authority to condition certain law 
 
114. See supra Section II.E (discussing the repeal of the CPP, which relied on a narrower 
statutory interpretation than the agency’s previous one). 
115. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 297 (4th Cir. 2018) (Gregory, 
J., concurring). 
116. Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 909 F.3d 723, 736-37 (5th Cir. 2018); Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 380-81, 387 (5th Cir. 2018); Texas v. 
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 181 (5th Cir. 2015). 
117. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 287 (7th Cir. 2018). 
118. Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 41-42 
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (Henderson, J., dissenting); U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 403 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
119. Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2016); 
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82132, at *23 
(D. Wyo. June 21, 2016). 
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enforcement grants on a city not adopting “sanctuary city” policies was 
impermissible.120 And in a concurring opinion in International Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, Fourth Circuit Judge Roger Gregory cited UARG 
in arguing that President Trump’s interpretation of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s (INA) provisions regarding the inadmissibility of certain 
aliens as the statutory basis for a ban on most non-American Muslims entering 
the United States was impermissible.121 The other two cases that dealt with an 
agency interpretation during the Trump Administration involved a citation of 
UARG in a dissent122 and as a point of comparison, explaining why a broad 
interpretation was permissible.123 Because major-questions-doctrine cases since 
UARG have only involved litigants challenging new agency statutory 
interpretations as giving the interpreting agency too much authority—and none 
have involved litigants challenging an agency for deregulating in a manner that 
is inconsistent with statutory text or purpose—the CPP rulemaking and 
litigation is broadly representative of recent major-questions-doctrine cases. 
U.S. Telecommunications Ass’n v. FCC, the ninth case citing the major 
questions doctrine as it is stated in UARG, dealt with whether the Obama-era 
statutory interpretation underlying the net-neutrality rule was a permissible 
interpretation. Commenting on Judge Brown and then-Judge Kavanaugh’s 
dissents to the denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Srinivasan, with Judge 
Tatel joining, alluded to some of the criticisms of the doctrine discussed in the 
literature and raised in section III.B, infra, by referring to the major questions 
doctrine not as a controlling doctrine but instead as “a doctrine that [then-Judge 
Kavanaugh] gleans from certain Supreme Court decisions.”124 While this case 
provides an interesting account of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
doctrine, as expressed by Judges Srinivasan, Brown, and Kavanaugh, its 
structure is consistent with the other eight major questions doctrine cases 
discussed here: a private litigant challenging the agency’s interpretation as too 
broad. Unlike the four other cases that deal with an Obama-era statutory 
interpretation, however, the D.C. Circuit here upheld the agency’s 
interpretation under Chevron. 
The second potential representativeness concern with the CPP—that it is 
hard to know whether the CPP case study is representative of major questions 
doctrine cases because it is hard to disaggregate the effects of the major 
questions doctrine from other litigation risks—carries more weight. Based on 
the available documents discussed in Part II, supra, it seems plausible that EPA 
GC engaged in a strategic evolution to protect itself against legal risks 
associated with the major questions doctrine, rather than a doctrinal evolution 
 
120. Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 287. 
121. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 297 (4th Cir. 2018) (Gregory, 
J., concurring) (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). 
122. Guedes, 920 F.3d at 6. 
123. Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 909 F.3d 723, 736-37 (5th Cir. 2018). 
124. U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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explained by a textual or purposive analysis. Moreover, the similarity between 
the CPP rulemaking and the other recent major-questions-doctrine cases (the 
fact that all involved a challenge to statutory interpretations that were allegedly 
overbroad), further suggests that the major questions doctrine was a decisive 
factor in EPA GC’s statutory interpretation evolution. While an interpretive 
evolution based on statutory text or purpose should be seen as broadly 
beneficial, such an evolution based on a highly subjective interpretive canon 
that is detached from both text and purpose should raise real concerns among 
both textualists and purposivists. 
That said, it is difficult to know with certainty why exactly various 
decisions were made without access to private documents or conversations with 
lawyers and policymakers at EPA, the White House, and the Department of 
Justice. As a result, painting a clearer picture of the way agency lawyers 
responded to the major questions doctrine in the CPP context based on 
documents and interviews that are currently unavailable would be a useful 
scholarly endeavor. And beyond the CPP, the empirical and qualitative 
literature on agency statutory interpretation would benefit from a more in-depth 
analysis of the way agency lawyers and policymakers believe the major 
questions doctrine impacts their work, beyond Walker’s initial empirical 
analysis of agency statutory interpretation broadly. 
III. Implications 
It is not possible to know with certainty why the EPA GC adjusted its 
legal analysis, or the degree of pushback from EPA policy officials, lawyers, or 
the Department of Justice to the new legal analysis or rescission. That said, 
several inferences can be made that provide insight into the ex ante effect of the 
major questions doctrine generally, not just in the CPP or environmental 
context. These inferences are possible even before scholars have access to 
internal documents or can interview lawyers and policymakers who were part 
of the rulemaking. 
In this Part, I first discuss how the CPP case study is consistent with the 
literature on presidential-driven regulatory policy and executive branch 
lawyers, but how it differs from the vision of purposive agency GCs discussed 
in Part I. Based on the case study, I then identify and discuss four concerns 
with the ex ante impact of the major questions doctrine on agency lawyers—
some of which share similarities with critiques of the ex post effects of the 
doctrine in the existing literature. First, rather than serving as an objective and 
nonideological tool of statutory interpretation, the major questions doctrine, as 
applied, incentivizes agency lawyers to privilege deregulatory statutory 
interpretations over proregulatory ones. This privileging has occurred in 
rulemakings when agency lawyers limit the novelty of a regulation, even if that 
regulation, as proposed, is within the statute’s text and purpose. Privileging has 
also occurred in rescissions because, to date, agency lawyers have not relied on 
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the major questions doctrine to check bold deregulatory executive action—
even though an objective understanding of the doctrine suggests it could apply 
with equal force to proregulatory and deregulatory interpretations. The 
doctrine’s lack of objectivity should trouble committed textualists, as much as 
it does those in favor of purposive statutory interpretation. Second, the major 
questions doctrine takes interpretive authority away from agency lawyers 
because it forces them to spend more time determining what constitutes a major 
question under a vague standard than working to understand and identify 
Congress’s intended purpose, a role they are uniquely situated to play within 
the separation of powers scheme. Critically, this focus on litigation risk occurs 
even when the litigation risk bears no relation to the statute’s text or purpose, 
but instead to a highly subjective interpretive canon like the major questions 
doctrine. Third, the doctrine has provided an easy tool for regulated-party 
commenters to exploit agency lawyers’ incentives and move regulations in a 
deregulatory direction by raising any colorable argument that a regulation is of 
economic or political significance. However, the doctrine has not provided 
such a tool to those other than regulated parties, including regulatory 
beneficiaries or those representing broad and diffuse interests. And fourth, the 
doctrine forces agency lawyers to guess what judges might think constitutes a 
major question because the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the term and 
because some judges use the major questions doctrine as a means to express 
policy, rather than legal, preferences. This definitional ambiguity has an even 
more corrosive effect on agency deliberative processes and agency lawyers’ 
roles within the separation of powers scheme than a clearly defined major 
questions doctrine would. 
A. Presidential-Driven Regulatory Policy and Agency Lawyers’ Incentives 
Both the direction to EPA to regulate carbon emissions from existing 
source-power plants and to repeal those regulations were presidential-driven 
regulations. President Obama committed in his Second Inaugural to “respond 
to the threat of climate change, knowing that the failure to do so would betray 
our children and future generations.”125 And with much fanfare, he directed the 
EPA to regulate in a particular area, including with reference to the specific 
statute under which the agency should regulate.126 Theoretically, this dynamic 
should have encouraged policymakers at EPA to put in place bold regulations 
that matched the President’s rhetoric. The proposed rule was just that—an 
interpretation of a provision in the CAA that would have had broad 
environmental benefits.127 Agency lawyers defended the regulation and its 
 
125. Inaugural Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 46 (Jan. 21, 2013). 
126. Presidential Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, supra note 51. 
  127. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830, 34936 (proposed June 18, 2014) (estimating climate benefits and 
health co-benefits to be “$33 billion to $54 billion in 2020 and $55 billion to $89 billion in 2030”). 
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interpretation of the CAA as lawful under Chevron, relying on both textual and 
purposive arguments. As I argued above, their Chevron analysis was 
persuasive. Further, President Trump’s announcement of the CPP rescission, 
flanked by coal miners and coal executives, should have had a similar effect on 
the executive branch. 
Due in large part to the major questions doctrine, however, the lawyers 
working with policymakers in both administrations faced very different 
incentives. And as a result, they had a vastly different impact on the 
administrations’ respective regulatory decisions. Despite the energized 
president and EPA policymakers, and the agency’s persuasive Chevron 
analysis, the major questions doctrine empowered regulated parties to have a 
major impact on the EPA GC’s office. UARG sought to limit compliance costs 
imposed on regulated parties, which EPA projected could be $5.5 to $7.5 
billion annually in 2020,128 so its comment invoked the major questions 
doctrine. And UARG had a much stronger case under this standard than under 
Chevron.129 
Faced with this dilemma, the EPA GC’s advice and policy officials’ likely 
reception to it was predictable, based on the executive-branch-lawyering 
literature: agency lawyers cautiously and appropriately advised their 
policymaking clients of legal risks, and policymakers heeded their advice.130 
However, the EPA GC did not ultimately play a purposive role in statutory 
interpretation. In an attempt to minimize litigation risk in a court-centered 
manner, the EPA GC adjusted its legal analysis. There was little reason its new 
interpretation of the CAA was more or less correct from the perspective of 
trying to reach the best interpretation of the statute. In fact, the EPA GC offered 
persuasive textual and purposive arguments in the proposal, and it did not 
address those arguments in the final rule, nor did it base its revised analysis on 
anything in the text or legislative history of the CAA. Rather, the EPA GC 
focused more on the novelty of its interpretation in the proposed rule and did 
not even fully accept industry’s criticism as true. It instead argued that 
narrowing its interpretation had the benefit of “allaying legal and other 
concerns raised by commenters,” that is, minimizing litigation risk related to 
the major questions doctrine.131 It is easy to imagine the major questions 
doctrine having this kind of effect in rulemakings spanning a vast range of 
policy areas—even when, as here, textual and purposive analyses support a 
broader reading of a statute. 
 
128. Id. at 34934. 
129. While the Supreme Court has not elaborated a standard that should be used in place of 
Chevron when the major questions doctrine is triggered, triggering of the doctrine has been fatal and the 
regulation has been held unlawful in all cases. 
130. Pillard, supra note 34, at 730 (arguing that government lawyers aim to “reduce risks of 
damaging losses” in court); see also Pillard, supra note 34, at 685 (arguing that government lawyers 
“speak[] with a level of authority that [their] clients overwhelmingly respect”). 
131. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64779 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
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B. Major Ex Ante Concerns with the Major Questions Doctrine 
Compared to the CPP rulemaking process, the CPP repeal shows that EPA 
lawyers believed that the major questions doctrine had no ex ante limiting 
effect on deregulatory agendas. And the fact that circuit and district courts have 
cited the major questions doctrine in nine recent cases, all of which involve a 
statutory interpretation that is allegedly overbroad, supports these lawyers’ 
views—even if a more objective major questions doctrine would have closely 
scrutinized a deregulatory statutory interpretation, like the CPP repeal.132 This 
disconnect is the first significant ex ante concern with the major questions 
doctrine: its lack of objectivity, which creates an incentive for agency lawyers 
to scrutinize proregulatory decisions skeptically while largely glossing over 
deregulatory decisions. During deregulatory rulemakings, agencies usually can 
rely on deferential judicial review under Chevron. They need not muster the 
same effort to persuade courts; unlike the 235 pages of detailed policy and 
legal analysis for the proposed rulemaking, the repeal documents were a mere 
15 pages. In other words, while the major questions doctrine allowed regulated 
parties to persuade risk-averse agency lawyers to have an ex ante limiting 
effect on a proregulatory rule, agency lawyers believed they had no analogous 
tool to limit a deregulatory action. As Heinzerling concluded in discussing the 
ex post effects of the doctrine, “[t]o make interpretive deference turn on the 
regulatory or deregulatory, or contractive or expansive, thrust of an agency’s 
choice is not a neutral choice.”133 The same can be said of the doctrine’s ex 
ante effects—a deeply problematic outcome, regardless of the rulemaking’s 
substantive policy area and regardless of one’s view on the administrative state 
or statutory interpretation. 
The second concern that the CPP case study raises is that the major 
questions doctrine diminishes the important role of agency lawyers in the 
separation of powers scheme by equipping regulated parties with a tool to limit 
agency lawyers’ interpretive and legal power in order to reach the regulated 
parties’ desired policy outcome. As discussed, one might expect agency GCs—
as opposed to OLC—to play a more purposive role in statutory interpretation 
than their OLC counterparts. And this role for agency GCs could be broadly 
productive in helping agencies reach the best interpretation of the law, given 
OLC’s likely differing perspective. But because of the major questions 
doctrine, the EPA GC’s ability to play this role was significantly diminished. 
Instead of focusing on the CAA’s purpose, lawyers focused on limiting 
litigation risk related to the major questions doctrine, given the likelihood that 
the interpretation would be reviewed under the “dice-loading” doctrine. 
This outcome is not textualist; it is merely another kind of purposivism 
that typically favors regulated parties over other parties. As in UARG, the 
 
132. By “objective,” I refer to a doctrine that scrutinizes regulatory and deregulatory agency 
action with equal force. 
133. Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 1986-87. 
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agency in the CPP rulemaking was arguably regulating based on what 
Heinzerling argued was “a congressional desire for the agency to reach new 
environmental problems without further recourse to the legislative process.”134 
If, as theorized above, agency lawyers changed their legal views following 
industry comment out of fear that courts would invoke the major questions 
doctrine, agency lawyers acted as agents of the courts to usurp interpretative 
power from the executive branch and the Congress that delegated interpretative 
authority to the agency. In doing so, agency lawyers also failed to play an 
important role that they are uniquely situated to play within the separation of 
powers scheme: purposive statutory interpreters. 
Acting to minimize litigation on its own does not present problems; of 
course lawyers should position their clients to win, rather than lose, in court. 
But where, as here, agency lawyers are left with little choice but to prioritize 
adherence to a highly subjective interpretive canon that did not exist when 
Congress passed the relevant statute, those lawyers cannot focus on a 
comprehensive understanding of congressional intent—one of their most 
important roles in the separation of powers scheme. 
In fact, the distortion of the major questions doctrine raises separation of 
powers concerns. Those concerns do not exist when agency lawyers minimize 
litigation risk by accurately determining congressional intent. For example, an 
agency lawyer actually enhances separation of powers values when she advises 
her policymaking client to narrow the scope of a rule that she believes exceeds 
the authority that Congress delegated to the agency. But a focus on litigation 
risk does raise separation of power concerns when agency lawyers feel they 
must minimize litigation risk by ignoring or deprioritizing congressional intent, 
especially when they do so in favor of highly subjective interpretive canons 
pushed by courts. For an example of this dynamic, one need look no further 
than the transition from the CPP proposed rule to the CPP final rule.  
Professor William Eskridge has argued that canons of statutory 
interpretation can enhance democratic values when they help judges 
“understand the policy assumptions, trade-offs, purposes, and deals that 
characterize the serious process of statute-making in our system.”135 The CPP 
case study shows that the major questions doctrine can do just the opposite, 
before cases are even litigated. Specifically, as was the case with the CPP, the 
doctrine skews all statutory-interpretation questions of economic or political 
significance. Agency lawyers are driven to ignore the explicit or implicit 
choices and trade-offs Congress made and the purposes with which it acted 
whenever an economically or politically significant rule is at issue. If regulated 
parties continue to invoke the doctrine in this way (which is likely given their 
success to date), agencies may less frequently gain a comprehensive 
understanding of congressional meaning and purpose. 
 
134. Id. at 1990-91. 
135. Eskridge, supra note 7, at 579. 
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The third ex ante concern with the major questions doctrine is that, while 
it equips regulated parties with a tool to influence agency lawyers, broad and 
diffuse interests that scholars have referred to as “regulatory beneficiaries” 
have no such tool.136 Unlike in the original rulemaking, agency lawyers did not 
have a significant influence on the repeal process because their legal analysis 
remained consistent with President Trump’s deregulatory vision from the time 
of the executive order, through the proposed rescission of the CPP, until the 
finalized ACE rule. In other words, agency lawyers during the CPP repeal did 
not act consistently with a vision of their role as purposive statutory 
interpreters. While one could easily argue that failing to combat climate change 
would impose significant economic costs and is inconsistent with the purpose 
of the CAA, agency lawyers did not address these arguments. And one 
explanation for this decision is that, based in part on the nine recent cases in 
which the district and circuit courts have invoked the major questions doctrine, 
the EPA GC did not believe courts would have required them to justify a 
deregulatory interpretation under a major-questions-doctrine analysis that 
focuses more on the rule’s economic or political significance than on statutory 
text or purpose.137 
The significant value of the doctrine for regulated parties but not for 
regulatory beneficiaries presents problems from both a democratic theory and 
legal perspective. With respect to democratic theory, Professor Nina 
Mendelson has described regulatory beneficiaries as those who “gain from 
government action but lack any focused or direct relationship with the 
agency.”138 Mendelson argues that, under a range of explanations for the 
democratic legitimacy of the administrative state, the views of regulatory 
beneficiaries should always factor into agency decisionmaking.139 But she 
notes that “whether regulatory beneficiaries can hold an agency accountable for 
implementing a particular statutory program will depend on the ability of 
beneficiaries to invoke external mechanisms of control,” including the “extent 
to which beneficiaries have access to agency processes.”140 As the CPP case 
study demonstrates, the major questions doctrine gives regulated parties a 
critical interpretive tool that allows those parties “access to agency processes.” 
 
136. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2007). 
137. Parties have not yet filed substantive briefs in the two existing challenges to the ACE rule 
before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. It will be worth revisiting this proposition once they do, but it 
is unclear what major-questions-doctrine arguments they could make to support their position that the 
rulemaking was procedurally or substantively unlawful. 
138. Mendelson, supra note 136, at 414. 
139. Id. at 419 (“Under a civic republican or neopluralist model, each of which takes an 
agency-centered approach to legitimacy, a regulatory beneficiary would want the opportunity to supply 
information to the agency and to participate fully in the agency’s decision-making process. In a 
neopluralist model, participation would help ensure that the agency considers (and aggregates) the full 
range of interests. In a civic republican model, participation by all affected groups, including regulatory 
beneficiaries, would increase the likelihood that the agency’s process will thoroughly engage relevant 
viewpoints and that the agency’s decision will thus be perceived as legitimate.”). 
140. Id. at 419-20. 
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But when it comes to regulatory beneficiaries—here environmental groups and 
those affected by climate change over the short- and long-term—the major 
questions doctrine cuts off “access to agency processes,” for the doctrine makes 
it riskier for agency lawyers and policymakers to consider regulatory 
beneficiaries’ views. Moreover, the doctrine diminishes what Eskridge calls 
“institutional or process values, such as . . . deliberation.”141 Agencies, through 
the experts they employ and their public comment processes, are more publicly 
deliberative than courts.142 And when courts usurp power from agencies in the 
manner described above, courts make the administrative decision-making 
process less deliberative. As a result, Professor Blake Emerson has argued that, 
in relying on the major questions doctrine, “the Court blinds itself to sources of 
popular input that may legitimate an administrative agency’s economically or 
politically significant policy choice.”143 
In addition, the doctrine’s privileging of regulated parties over regulated 
beneficiaries also presents legal problems. In particular, the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), in affording “interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments,”144 envisions a regulatory process whereby individuals and 
organizations can present criticisms and competing views, whether or not the 
agency is directly regulating their conduct. This vision of “interested” persons’ 
participation includes both regulated parties and regulatory beneficiaries, where 
both have a similar opportunity to participate. But the major questions doctrine 
empowers regulated parties at the expense of regulatory beneficiaries, contrary 
to the text and spirit of the APA. Whether in environmental rulemakings or 
other substantive policy areas, generally privileging regulated parties’ preferred 
statutory interpretations over those of other groups has no textual or purposive 
basis but, as this case study has shown, is a natural outgrowth of the major 
questions doctrine. As a result, while it is easy to maintain the regulatory status 
quo (or even turn back from it), it is far harder for risk-averse agency lawyers 
to advise their policymaking clients to adopt proregulatory approaches, even 
when doing so would be consistent with the constitutionally constructive role 
of agency lawyers as purposivists, or the alternative vision of agency lawyers 
as textualists. 
The final ex ante concern with the major questions doctrine is that agency 
lawyers are left to guess what judges might think constitutes a major question. 
Speculation is necessary because the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the 
term, and some judges use the major questions doctrine as a means to express 
 
141. Eskridge, supra note 7, at 580. 
142. See Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to ‘Major Questions’: On the Democratic 
Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2025 (2018) (arguing that 
“agencies’ procedural mechanisms and institutional position can promote deliberative, inclusive, and 
rational decision-making”). 
143. Id. at 2083. 
144. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018) (emphasis added). 
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policy preferences, not legal ones. As discussed above, the judges of the D.C. 
Circuit announced widely divergent opinions on what constitutes a major 
question during the CPP oral argument. Then-Judge Kavanaugh thought that 
the CPP clearly constituted such a situation. He even cited critics of the major 
questions doctrine who worried that the doctrine may be invoked in the CPP 
litigation.145 Then-Judge Kavanaugh strongly believed that the major questions 
doctrine was triggered because of the economic and political significance of the 
regulation, and used the language of the doctrine to make emphatic policy 
arguments against any environmental regulation that imposes costs on fossil-
fuel reliant communities. As he said during oral argument, because of the rule, 
“lots of people [could] lose their jobs, lose their livelihoods” and “whole 
communities are going to be left behind.”146 Judges Griffith and Tatel, on the 
other hand, were of the view that the CPP was far from “transformative.”147 
Rather, they noted that the CPP was merely a modest acceleration of the 
direction the electricity sector was already headed.148 
How could judges disagree on the supposedly objective question of 
whether a case involves a major question? One possibility is that the Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeals have not established a clear-enough standard of 
what constitutes a major question, leading judges to use their own measures. 
This ambiguity inherently leads to subjectivity. While it is clear from the CPP 
oral argument that this ambiguity causes predictability concerns ex post, the ex 
ante predictability concerns may be just as significant. Without a clear standard 
for what constitutes a major question, risk-averse agency lawyers who seek to 
avoid losing in court may interpret statutes even more narrowly than under a 
clear-cut major questions doctrine standard. Furthermore, the lack of a clear 
standard increasingly empowers regulated parties to take advantage of these 
lawyers’ incentives, above even a more well-defined major questions doctrine. 
As a result, agency GCs are less able to play the constitutionally constructive 
role of purposive statutory interpreters, or even textual statutory interpreters. 
Finally, when judges use the major questions doctrine to express policy 
preferences, agency lawyers may face pressure to adopt judges’ policy 
preferences, rather than those of Congress. This phenomenon is unjustifiable 
from a separation of powers perspective, regardless of the substantive policy 
area in which it occurs and regardless of one’s views on the administrative state 
or statutory interpretation. 
 
145. Oral Argument at 46, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 
2016). 
146. Id. at 63. 
147. Id. at 5-6. 
148. Id. at 6-7. 
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IV. Illusory Benefits of the Major Questions Doctrine and Corrective Action 
While I have discussed some of the major questions doctrine’s most 
negative effects, the doctrine is of course not without its proponents—both 
those generally opposed to the Chevron deference regime and those generally 
in favor it. In this Part, I discuss the flaws with the arguments in favor of the 
major questions doctrine and argue that the Court should abandon the doctrine 
in its current form, especially since it has not announced it in a clear or 
predictable way. Beyond simply abandoning the doctrine, I also recommend 
ways to cabin some of the most troubling ex ante impacts of the major 
questions doctrine, including ways that the Court could better define what 
constitutes a major question. But assuming that the Court continues to rely on 
the doctrine, I also discuss legislation that would allow the political branches to 
reclaim the interpretive authority that they are better equipped to hold. 
A. Counterarguments in Favor of the Doctrine 
In this Section, I address four potential counterarguments—arguments that 
the major questions doctrine carries normative ex ante or ex post weight and 
arguments that the major questions doctrine is an imperfect but necessary tool 
in the complex world of agency statutory interpretation. Specifically, I argue 
that these counterarguments suffer from logical circularities, line-drawing 
problems, and errors in strategic judgement, among other problems. 
First, a logical place to begin is then-Judge Stephen Breyer’s view on the 
application of Chevron, which Justice O’Connor later cited in the Brown & 
Williamson majority opinion. As Breyer wrote, “Congress is more likely to 
have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial 
matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily 
administration.”149 This principle continues to animate the major questions 
doctrine, but it has been called “conclusory.”150 While Breyer’s point may be 
correct in certain circumstances, it is also possible to envision scenarios where 
Congress intentionally delegates larger interpretive questions to agencies. In 
particular, Congress may do so if it believes that a certain issue requires 
frequent reexamination and policy change, with either speed or expertise that 
the executive branch uniquely possesses.151 This is just the kind of scenario 
illustrated by the CPP case study. Further, scholars have shown that members 
 
149. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 370 (1986); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
150. Richardson, supra note 19, at 391. 
151. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2006) (stating that, in drafting the 
CAA, Congress understood that, “without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific 
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete”). 
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of Congress and their staffs are aware of Chevron deference and thus know that 
drafting vague statutes will empower agencies to a certain degree.152 
The second argument in favor of the major questions doctrine is that it 
prevents agency aggrandizement “so serious that it outweighs Chevron’s 
general benefits.”153 To the degree one sees agency aggrandizement as a 
concern, this justification for the major questions doctrine may seem appealing. 
But Professor Daryl Levinson has argued persuasively that agency 
aggrandizement is far from a common motivating factor among agency 
officials: 
 
Unlike dictators, democratic representatives do not benefit directly from 
expanding the wealth or power of government institutions. Also unlike dictators, 
but just like corporate managers, democratic representatives are highly 
responsive to, and constrained by, the interests of their constituents. These two 
observations lead to the methodological prescription that predictions of 
government behavior should be based primarily on constituent-driven political 
pressures brought to bear on government officials and secondarily on the set of 
independent interests these officials might realistically pursue in the space 
afforded them by democratic agency slack.154  
 
Moreover, even if agency aggrandizement actually motivated agency actors, an 
agency-aggrandizement justification raises line-drawing problems of its own: 
precisely when is agency aggrandizement a serious enough concern to call 
Chevron into question?155 In practice, it is difficult to examine the CPP case 
study, for example, and conclude that EPA lawyers acted principally to 
enhance their—or even their agency’s—power. More likely, they were 
motivated by a desire to avoid damaging losses in court.156 Moreover, just as 
one could tell a story of agency lawyers motivated by enhancing agency power, 
the theory of agency lawyers who become expert in their agency’s authorizing 
statutes, discussed in Part II supra, is at least as theoretically sound as the 
agency-aggrandizement view. And under the former theory of agency lawyers, 
even textualists may prefer an interpretive scenario in which agency lawyers 
rely on their expertise regarding congressional intent to an interpretive scenario 
 
152. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 45, at 902, 1003 (showing that Chevron is one of the few 
doctrines about which Congressional drafters are generally aware, but later showing that Congressional 
drafters report that they attempt to resolve major questions themselves notwithstanding the difficulty of 
defining that term). 
153. Richardson, supra note 19, at 398. 
154. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 922 (2005). 
155. Another and perhaps more narrowly tailored solution to this question can be found in 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 323-25 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Chevron deference should be denied when agencies interpret a statute to 
determine whether that agency has jurisdiction over a particular issue or area). 
156. At times, avoiding damaging losses in court might overlap with avoiding the loss of 
agency power. But this overlap is different from an agency aggrandizement theory, which assumes 
agency actors focus on affirmatively enhancing the power of their agency whenever possible. 
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in which judges rely on a “dice-loading” or substantive canon that can run 
counter to Congress’s intended purpose. As Judge Amy Coney Barrett has 
written: 
 
A judge applying a substantive canon often exchanges the best interpretation of 
a statutory provision for a merely bearable one. In doing so, she abandons not 
only the usual textualist practice of interpreting a statute as it is most likely to be 
understood by a skilled user of the language, but also the more fundamental 
textualist insistence that a faithful agent must adhere to the product of the 
legislative process, not strain its language to account for abstract intention or 
commonly held social values.157 
 
In the CPP case study, there is a strong argument that just this phenomenon 
occurred. A natural reading of the statute and its context suggests that the 
agency had broad authority, including to regulate beyond the source itself. But 
the major questions doctrine led to an interpretation that relied more on an 
“abstract intention” or perceived “social value” about the manner in which 
Congress delegates authority than on congressional intent in this particular 
statute. 
The third argument in favor of the major questions doctrine is that it 
promotes the principle that agencies should not interfere with Congress while 
Congress is actively legislating on a given subject. The noninterference 
rationale is likely the most accurate proxy for when an agency is attempting to 
usurp power that Congress believes it possesses.158 But it too has two 
significant problems. First, as the CPP case study illustrates, courts and agency 
lawyers do not just rely on the major questions doctrine when Congress is 
actively legislating; the CPP dealt with a decades-old statute that the EPA had 
relied on since enactment. Second, the noninterference principle may not 
actually overlap with issues of major economic and political significance as 
much as its proponents suggest. For example, Congress could be actively 
legislating on an issue that is neither politically salient nor economically costly. 
In that scenario, one might argue that the agency should refrain from regulating 
in a novel way, but that is not the major questions doctrine. Third, a 
noninterference rationale creates an incentive for a Congress opposed to agency 
action in a given area to “actively legislate” as a pretext for preventing agency 
action. Fourth, it is unclear precisely what it means for Congress to be “actively 
 
157. Barrett, supra note 48, at 124 (citing John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the 
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 124 (2001) (“If textualists believe, moreover, that statutes mean what a 
reasonable person would conventionally understand them to mean, then applying a less natural (though 
still plausible) interpretation is arguably unfaithful to the legislative instructions contained in the 
statute.”). 
158. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron 
Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 593, 632 (2008) (arguing that the noninterference rationale is normatively persuasive because 
agencies should not regulate when doing so “would interfere with or harmfully duplicate a congressional 
bargain”). 
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legislating.” In divided government, does the fact that a minority party in 
Congress dislikes a statute and repeatedly proposes but fails to repeal it 
constitute “actively legislating”? In the CPP case study, should the then-current 
Congress’s perceived disapproval of the CPP have been a factor in a court’s 
review? Or is the only Congress that matters the Congress that passed the 
statute? These questions make the noninterference rationale difficult to justify 
in practice. 
The final argument in favor of the major questions doctrine is a strategic 
one: without it, the Supreme Court would likely overturn Chevron.159 This 
argument, while provocative, suffers from critical strategic errors. First, ending 
Chevron is not inevitable. While current Supreme Court justices have criticized 
Chevron to varying degrees, articulating an alternative principle that is an 
improvement over the status quo from both a separation of powers perspective 
and an administrability standpoint is difficult. For example, a ruling that 
Chevron is inconsistent with the APA would leave open the question of how 
precisely courts should review agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 
This ambiguity would be particularly problematic in cases where technical 
expertise that judges tend to lack is a critical part of de novo review—as seems 
to be the case with the CAA in the CPP case study.  
The Court could also overrule Chevron on constitutional grounds, 
bringing about a return to the nondelegation doctrine. Notwithstanding the 
questionable constitutional necessity for that alternative,160 it would 
fundamentally transform our system of government in ways that even the most 
fervent Chevron opponents may find untenable.161 In the CPP case study, 
imagine Congress dealing with the level of detail that EPA addressed in the 
technical and legal documents it released with the proposed and final rules. 
Second, it is not clear why relying on a tool (perhaps in addition to other tools) 
as a means to limit Chevron necessarily precludes the full-scale termination of 
Chevron. Based on the CPP case study and the D.C. Circuit oral argument, one 
could theorize that Justice Kavanaugh, for example, sees the major questions 
doctrine as a step towards Chevron repeal, rather than an end in itself. 
 
159. Richardson, supra note 19, at 420 (arguing that the doctrine is a “Chevron safety valve . . 
. in cases where the Chevron-Marbury tension is most salient” and a Chevron “fig leaf” in high profile 
cases because it “hides Chevron from view”). 
160. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. 
L. REV. 937, 937 (2018) (disagreeing with the idea that Chevron deference removes “independent 
judgement” from courts and arguing that “[t]he power implicitly delegated to an agency by an 
ambiguous statute is not the power to interpret the statute, but the power to make a policy choice within 
the limits set by the possible meanings of the statute.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (arguing that while the Supreme Court has not struck down a statute on 
nondelegation grounds since 1935, the Court also never struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds 
until that same year). 
161. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 728 
(1994) (arguing that even if Congress attempts to pass only extremely directive rules, certain kinds of 
“subsidiary rules” will be necessary to the executive branch’s law enforcement and regulatory 
functions). 
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B. Solutions to the Major Questions Doctrine’s Ex Ante Impacts 
Because the arguments in favor of the doctrine fall short of justifying its 
damaging ex ante impacts, one of the three branches of government would be 
well-served to mitigate these impacts. Optimally, the judiciary itself would 
correct the problem it created. Short of simply overruling itself (which it 
should), the Supreme Court could cabin the doctrine in several ways, based on 
lessons learned from the CPP case study. At the most basic level, the Court 
could clarify that the major questions doctrine never applies when a delegation 
is clear. The Court could also clearly define what constitutes a major question. 
This change would begin to address the democratic and public-values concern 
that the doctrine provides regulated parties with a roadmap to invalidate agency 
interpretations by invoking any colorable argument that a regulation deals with 
an issue of political or economic significance. But this change would be 
difficult to accomplish in practice because so many regulations (and regulations 
that are litigated in particular) could be considered major. Moreover, even if 
such a change were possible, this change alone would not be sufficient to 
eliminate the ex ante objectivity and predictability concerns with the doctrine. 
With regard to objectivity, if the Court is to continue to rely on the doctrine, it 
would be well-served to utilize the doctrine when agencies make deregulatory 
policy changes, in addition to when agencies shift towards more regulation. For 
example, if an agency chooses to regulate with less stringency than it has in the 
past, and if litigants are able to establish that the regulation deals with an issue 
of major political or economic significance, that regulatory change could be 
reviewed de novo rather than under Chevron. Since UARG, no court has used 
the major questions doctrine in this way, nor has any court explicitly ruled out 
doing so.162 Of course, even a doctrine that was more objective in that it 
evaluated regulatory and deregulatory agency action with equal force would 
still strive to answer the almost unanswerable question of what makes a 
regulation major. 
The Court could also make the doctrine more predictable by applying it 
only to interpretations of statutes that were passed after the Court announced 
the major questions doctrine in UARG. The rationale for such a limitation is 
that Congress is now on notice that it ought to be explicit when it delegates 
authority to agencies on questions of major political or economic significance 
(assuming the Court gives Congress a clear definition of what constitutes an 
issue of major political or economic significance in the first place). But prior to 
the Court announcing the doctrine, Congress may have used broad statutory 
language in delegations when it intended to allow an agency to use that 
authority to address future, unknown problems, as was the case in the CAA. 
Some may argue that the onus should be on Congress to clarify its past 
 
162. This recommendation may also require overturning other precedents because judicial 
review of agency inaction is generally “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.” Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
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ambiguous delegations on issues of major political or economic significance. 
But this argument is inconsistent with the rule that the enacting Congress’s 
intent controls in matters of statutory interpretation and is detached from the 
realities of the contemporary Congress’s stagnation. 
Finally, the Court could address the critique that the doctrine leads to less 
deliberative policymaking by invoking it only when the agency regulatory 
process was insufficiently deliberative. For example, as Emerson has argued, 
the Court could defer to major agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes 
only if “the agency has responded to the affected public in making its policy 
choice” and “the agency has addressed the relevant questions of political 
value.”163 Under this standard—which shares a process-oriented focus with the 
Mead rule that Chevron deference is largely reserved for regulations that have 
gone through notice and comment—as long as EPA lawyers adequately 
addressed industry concerns in the final rule and the accompanying legal 
analysis, EPA lawyers would have had significantly more leeway to advise 
policymakers in favor of adopting a proregulatory approach, consistent with 
either a purposive or textual vision of agency lawyers.164 
Of course, it seems unlikely that the current Court will reverse course. As 
a result, the political branches should do what they can to reclaim the 
interpretive authority that is rightly theirs. The CPP case study illustrates that 
executive-branch policymakers and lawyers can do little on their own to 
diminish the effect of the major questions doctrine. Compelling purposive and 
even textual arguments under Chevron are not enough. Similarly, while agency 
GCs could choose to focus more on expansive proregulatory interpretations 
notwithstanding the risks, it is difficult to expect an agency lawyer to do so 
when the risk of losing in court is sufficiently high. 
This leaves legislation—passed by Congress and signed by the 
President—overturning or cabining the major questions doctrine as the best 
available option for policymakers concerned about the doctrine’s corrosive 
effects. In 2016, the House of Representatives passed the “Separation of 
Powers Restoration Act of 2016,”165 which would have amended the APA to 
require courts to “decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the 
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions.”166 Legislation 
overturning or cabining the major questions doctrine could be modeled off of 
this legislation by prohibiting courts from considering the economic or political 
significance of agency statutory interpretations when deciding under which 
standard to review those interpretations, or by adopting one of the cabining 
 
163. Emerson, supra note 142, at 2028. 
164. In fact, under this standard, the final rule’s accompanying legal analysis sufficiently 
addressed industry’s concerns with building blocks 2 and 3, most of which are the same arguments it 
would have needed to make with respect to building block 4. 
165. Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (as passed by 
House, July 12, 2016). 
166. Id. 
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methods discussed earlier in this section.167 If the 2020 election brings electoral 
change, policymakers should look for ways to pass legislation like this—
legislation that would halt regulated parties’ and the judiciary’s usurpation of 
critical interpretive authority from the political branches. 
Conclusion 
The CPP rulemaking is just one case study, but the major questions 
doctrine’s ex ante effects throughout the case study illustrate what is likely to 
come—not just in environmental rulemakings but also in high-profile 
rulemakings generally—if the courts travel down the preferred path of major-
questions-doctrine advocates. This reality is highly problematic, even if the 
Court relies on the doctrine only infrequently. Based on their incentives, 
agency lawyers will likely push agency policymakers in a deregulatory 
direction, even if doing so is contrary to statutory text or purpose, and even if 
those lawyers believe they ought to play a purposive role that would prioritize a 
different regulatory course. While this result might please those who are 
ideologically committed to a deregulatory agenda, it should be of deep concern 
to everyone else, including those who believe that regulation should be the 
result of agency deliberative processes, not simply dictated by regulated 
parties, and those who believe agency lawyers play an important textual or 
purposive role in the separation of powers scheme. After all, agency lawyers 
and technical experts, accountable ultimately to a democratically elected 
president and the population at large through deliberative processes, are better 
equipped to hold this authority than regulated-party lobbyists or the far-off 
threat of “black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices.”168 
 
167. If such a bill became law, the Court could still overturn Chevron. As a result, some may 
argue that in amending the APA, Congress should also codify Chevron. But the legislation discussed 
here—simply instructing courts to apply the same standard whenever they interpret ambiguous statutes 
or cabining the major questions doctrine in another modest way—could be cast as a technical fix to a 
judicial doctrine that has caused significant objectivity, predictability, and democratic and public-values 
problems. Codifying Chevron, on the other hand, would likely attract far more attention, given past 
congressional interest in legislation to repeal it. This is not to say that the legislation discussed here 
would pass easily, particularly given the sixty-vote threshold in the Senate. But with a different 
Administration and potentially more votes in the Senate, this is the kind of provision that might succeed 
if attached to spending legislation or another more politically salient statute. 
168. Janus v. American Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
